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PROVING A NEGATIVE-WHEN THE TAXPAYER
DENIES RECEIPT
INTRODUCTION
The Tax Court attaches a presumption of correctness to the Com-
missioner's tax assessment in an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defi-
ciency notice.' The taxpayer has the burden of proving the notice
erroneous. 2 When the IRS bases the assessment on the disallowance of
deductions, placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer is reasonable
because the taxpayer has better access to evidence of the underlying
transactions. It is also appropriate to assign the taxpayer the burden of
proof when a deficiency notice asserts undeclared income and the tax-
payer contests the inclusion. In such a case, the taxpayer can rely upon
his or her records to show that money received was a gift, that the IRS
incorrectly calculated the amount realized on the sale of an asset, or any
other reason why the disputed amount should not be included in
income.
Different questions arise, however, when the taxpayer denies re-
ceipt of the money or benefit. Unlike a case where the taxpayer can
prevail by proving a positive, for example, that the amount received was
a gift or was part of the asset's basis, the taxpayer denying receipt must
prove a negative-nonreceipt. On occasion, courts have acknowledged
the inequity that results from requiring the taxpayer to produce evi-
dence of a nonevent by reviewing the IRS determination for
arbitrariness.
3
This Note first reviews the normal burden of proof and presump-
tion of correctness in litigation between the IRS and taxpayers in Tax
Court.4 It then examines the ways in which courts allow an allegation
or showing of IRS arbitrariness to alter the normal operation of the bur-
den of proof and presumption of correctness in cases of undeclared in-
come.5 The Note contends that courts inadequately distinguish between
the issues involved in denial of receipt cases and those involved in other
issues related to undeclared income. Consequently, the case law reveals
a confusing array of standards as to what constitutes arbitrariness and
how it must be shown.
The Note concludes that the present system of reviewing denial of
receipt cases to determine whether the IRS notice is arbitrary fails to
I See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
2 See infra note 9.
3 See infra text accompanying note 36.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 9-28.
5 See infra Parts III-V.
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redress the inequity of forcing the taxpayer to prove a negative. 6 Analo-
gizing from the procedure for contesting an accumulated earnings tax,
7
the Note proposes the establishment of a procedure that requires the
IRS to prove receipt if the taxpayer files a sworn statement of denial
with supporting facts. 8
I
BURDENS OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS
IN TAX COURT
In Tax Court the taxpayer normally bears both the initial burden
of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion. 9 The federal
courts of appeals I0 concur with this allocation of the burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion when the taxpayer is challenging a deficiency notice
based on disallowance of a deduction." To prevail, the taxpayer must
prove that the IRS determination is wrong, and must prove the correct
amount of the deduction. 12 When the deficiency is assessed on un-
declared income, most courts maintain the burden of persuasion on the
taxpayer to prove the determination erroneous,' 3 but do not uniformly
6 See in/fa text accompanying notes 83-86.
7 See in/ra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
9 "The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise provided by
statute or determined by the Court; and except that, in respect of any new matter, increases
in deficiency, and affirmative defenses, pleaded in his answer, it shall be upon the respon-
dent." TAx CT. R. 142(a).
The term "burden of proof" encompasses two different concepts: the burden of persua-
sion and the burden of production. If, at the close of all the evidence, the trier of fact deter-
mines that both sides have presented evidence of equal weight, the party with the burden of
persuasion loses. The burden of production, on the other hand, is the burden of coming
forward with evidence. The burden of production shifts when a party meets and successfully
rebuts the evidence previously submitted by its opponent; the burden of persuasion rarely
shifts. See H. DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAx COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 320
(1979); Piper & Jerge, Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Court, 31 TAX LAw. 303, 304 (1978)
(discussing distinction between two burdens in context of Tax Court). The tendency of courts
to refer, at times, to burden of proof without specification contributes to confusion in the area
and increases the difficulty of analysis.
10 The Tax Court will follow a court of appeals decision "which is squarely in point
where appeal from [the Tax Court's] decision lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court
alone." Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970) (footnote omitted), af d, 445 F.2d
985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
11 Eg., Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1015 (1975) ("[T]here is no dispute that the taxpayer bears the burden of proof in substantia-
ting claimed deductions.").
12 See Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223, 227 (1931) ("The burden of proof to establish a
deductible loss and the amount of it, clearly, was upon the [taxpayer].'). But cf. Welch v.
Comissioner, 297 F.2d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 1961) (Tax Court "not justified in basing its decision
upon the failure of the taxpayer to show the precise amount of the deductions').
13 Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 277 (1980) (Tannenwald, J., concurring) (no
distinction in burden of proof should be made between cases of deductions and unreported
income), a ffdinpartandrev'dinpart, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Rexach, 482
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require the taxpayer to prove the correct amount. 14 In some circuits,
however, once the taxpayer produces enough evidence to show that the
determination could be erroneous, the burden of persuasion is on the
Commissioner to establish the existence and amount of the deficiency.
15
The Supreme Court first referred to the presumption of correctness
of an IRS deficiency notice in Welch v. Helvering.16 The Court noted that
the Commissioner's ruling has "the support of a presumption of correct-
ness," while the "[taxpayer] has the burden of proving it to be wrong."'
17
The concept of presumptive correctness stated in Welch was not new to
tax proceedings;' it followed a long-recognized principle that the gov-
ernment's administrative actions are presumed correct.' 9
Courts and commentators attribute several functions to the pre-
F.2d 10, 17 (Ist Cir.) ("burdens of going forward and of ultimate persuasion are always on the
taxpayer"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
14 E.g., Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1977) ("In a Tax Court
deficiency proceeding, once the taxpayer has established that the assessment is erroneous, the
burden shifts to the government to prove the correct amount of any taxes owed."); Clark v.
Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698, 706 (9th Cir. 1959) (taxpayer need not prove actual amount of
deficiency).
15 In these minority decisions, the Commissioner's production burden is satisfied by the
presumption of correctness. If the taxpayer overcomes the presumption and meets his or her
production burden, the burden of persuasion remains on the Commissioner to prove the exist-
ence and amount of deficiency. In Sharwell v. Commissioner, 419 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir.
1969), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayer has the
burden of proving the incorrectness of a deficiency determination. This burden is procedural
and is met if the taxpayer produces evidence from which it could be found that he or she did
not receive the income. If met, "'the burden of proof shifts back to the Commissioner to
prove the existence and amount of the deficiency.'" Id. (quoting Foster v. Commissioner, 391
F.2d 727, 735 (4th Cir. 1968)). See also Stout v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1959).
But see United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 n.3 (1st Cir.) (suggesting that Foster is not
inconsistent with prevailing view), ceri. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
The Ninth Circuit has vacillated on the question of who has the burden of persuasion in
a case of undeclared income. Compare Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 885-86 (9th
Cir. 1975) (it "might make sense" to shift burden of persuasion when taxpayer meets burden
of production in cases of undeclared income but no need to decide this issue because dispute
involved deduction) and Herbert v. Commissioner, 377 F.2d 65, 71 (9th Cir. 1967) (general
rule is that burden of proof is on Commissioner to establish "receipt of income") with Clark v.
Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698, 709 (9th Cir. 1959) (taxpayers "failed to sustain their burden of
proof that . . . [they] had not received the benefit arising from these unreported sales").
16 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
t7 Id. at 115 (dicta). In making this statement, the Court relied in part on its holding in
Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101 (1927), that "the decision of the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue was not conclusive, but only furnished primafacie evidence of its correctness."
290 U.S. at 105. The lower courts in Wickwire had held that the Commissioner's finding
could not be reviewed "unless impeached for fraud, bad faith, or mistaken legal theory." Id.
at 103.
18 See, e.g., Avery v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d 6, 8 (5th Cir. 1927) (well-settled rule that
Commissioner's findings are prima facie correct).
19 H. DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 324. But see Rice, Tax, Fact and Fiction: Presumptions in
Ta Cases, 1 S.D.L. REv. 56, 59-60 (1956) (arguing that this concept is insupportable when
applied to IRS because of its prosecutive capacity).
The Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, which created the Board of Tax
Appeals (predecessor to the Tax Court), allowed the Board to develop its own procedures and
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sumption of correctness. First, and most commonly, courts contend that
the presumption sets the threshold level of the taxpayer's initial produc-
tion burden. 20 To overcome the presumption, the taxpayer must pro-
duce enough evidence to show that the determination could be
erroneous. Second, the presumption fulfills the symbolic function of em-
phasizing that the taxpayer has the burden of persuasion.2 1 A third,
more substantive purpose of the presumption is to increase the quantity
and quality of the evidence needed to prevail, thereby assuring that the
taxpayer produces all the evidence in his or her possession. 22 .
Judicial opinions vary regarding the effect that overcoming the pre-
sumption of correctness has on the allocation of the burdens of proof.
23
The prevailing view is that when the taxpayer presents sufficient evi-
dence to show that the determination could be erroneous, the presump-
tion vanishes and the burden of production shifts to the
Commissioner.24 The ultimate burden of persuasion, however, remains
on the taxpayer.25 Hence, even if the taxpayer overcomes the presump-
tion by showing that the determination could be erroneous, the Com-
missioner can still prevail without producing any evidence if the court
remains unpersuaded by the taxpayer's case.
26
Decisions of the Tax Court occasionally appear to depart from this
approach by finding for the taxpayer because the IRS failed to produce
evidence after the presumption was overcome. 27 A more accurate expla-
rules of evidence. In general, the Board adopted the forms of procedure from federal court
tax proceedings. See H. DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 151.
20 E.g., Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1975) (presumption is
"procedural device" requiring taxpayer to come forward with evidence).
21 Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 276 (1980) (Tannenwald, J., concurring)
("only function of [presumption of correctness] is to make clear. . that the burden of proof
is and remains upon the taxpayer"), afd in part and revod in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
22 See Note, Federal Income Taxation--Decieny Assessments in Unreported Income Cases, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 641, 644 & n.17 (1981).
There is no presumption that the IRS is correct on questions of law. 9 J. MERTENS, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.64 (J. Doheny rev. ed. 1982).
23 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the confusion among the circuit courts as to
whether rebutting the presumption of correctness shifts the burden of persuasion to the Com-
missioner, but has declined to decide the issue. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 442
(1976).
24 See, e.g., Potts, Davis & Co. v. Commissioner, 431 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1970). But
see United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir.) ("burdens of going forward and of
ultimate persuasion. . . never shift to the Commissioner"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
25 See 2A L. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 8.6 (1981); Dubroff & Grossman, The
United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 42 ALBANY L. REv. 191, 205 (1978).
26 H. DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 323; accord Demkowicz v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 929,
931 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1977).
27 Eg., Schildhaus v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1463, 1470 (1969) ("[Tax-
payer's] evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness . . . and, since
[Commissioner] did not go forward with any evidence . . . , these items should not be in-
cluded in . . . gross income . . . "), afd, 442 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1971). Accord Herbert v.
Commissioner, 377 F.2d 65, 70 (9th Cir. 1967) (once taxpayer rebuts presumption of correct-
ness, burden of proving taxpayer received income is on Commissioner).
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nation of these cases, however, is that the taxpayer not only overcame
the presumption of correctness, but met the persuasion burden as well.
28
When the taxpayer's evidence is this substantial, the Commissioner can-
not prevail without producing further evidence.
II
DISTINGUISHING RECEIPT FROM OTHER ISSUES OF
UNDECLARED INCOME
Although courts acknowledge differences in burdens of proof be-
tween deficiencies assessed on undeclared income and deficiencies based
on disallowed deductions,2 9 few undeclared income decisions clearly dis-
tinguish between issues relating to a taxpayer's denial of receipt of
money or other benefits and issues relating to a taxpayer's contention
that money or benefits admittedly received are not includible in income.
Questions of includibility in income focus on whether money received
was a gift, on the amount realized as income on a sale, the valuation of
an asset, or the timing of recognition of gain as income. These cases are
analogous to those involving deductions in that the taxpayer generally
has the best access to evidence of the nature of the transaction. 30 Plac-
ing the burden of persuasion on the taxpayer in these cases is, therefore,
reasonable.
The substantive tax issues involved in determining whether certain
transactions result in recognizable income to the taxpayer differ signifi-
cantly from the issues attendant to taxpayer denial of receipt cases. In
these cases the taxpayer confronts the difficult task of proving a nega-
tive-that is, of proving nonreceipt. The Tax Court has attempted in
some cases to ease the taxpayer's burden by denying the IRS the benefit
of relying solely on the presumption of correctness without direct evi-
dence if the taxpayer alleges that the deficiency notice is arbitrary.
3 1
28 Casey resolves this discrepancy by saying that, after the presumption is overcome, the
production burden does not shift until the taxpayer produces sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case. The Commissioner would then lose for failure to submit further evidence.
2A L. CASEY, supra note 25, § 8.6; accord H. DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 321-33.
29 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
30 See Rice, supra note 19, at 62.
31 See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
The Tax Court may also relax the standard for making out a prima facie case to shift the
burden of production to the Commissioner when the taxpayer has the burden of persuasion to
establish nonreceipt. E.g., Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 277 (1980) (Tannenwald,
J., concurring), afd in part and rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); Schildhaus v. Commis-
sioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1463, 1469, afd, 442 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1971); see 9 J. MERTENS,




ARBITRARINESS IN THE CONTEXT OF UNDECLARED
INCOME
An allegation of arbitrariness is a request for the court to "look
behind the statutory notice" to examine the procedures or motives of the
IRS.32 The Tax Court generally refuses to determine whether a defi-
ciency notice is arbitrary.33 The principal rationale for this rule is that,
because a Tax Court proceeding is a de novo trial, the Tax Court evalu-
ates the tax assessment based on the evidence submitted without con-
cern for possible IRS improprieties committed earlier in the process.
34
Recently, however, the Tax Court has developed an exception to this
general rule.35 In cases involving undeclared income, it will now con-
sider a taxpayer's allegation of arbitrariness if the Commissioner relies
solely on the presumption of correctness and does not submit any direct
evidence.36 No clear standard has emerged, however, for defining arbi-
trariness in the context of these undeclared income cases.
In Hevering v. Taylor,37 the Supreme Court first recognized that gov-
ernment arbitrariness in a case of alleged undeclared income alters the
allocation of burdens. In Tay/or the court of appeals found that the
Commissioner's apportionment of the purchase price as basis between
preferred and common stock was unfair and erroneous, rendering the
tax determination excessive. For this reason, the appellate court re-
versed the Board of Tax Appeals' decision sustaining the Commis-
sioner's ruling. Arguing before the Supreme Court, the Commissioner
contended that the burden was on the taxpayer to prove the correct
amount. Because he had not done so, the Board's determination of the
amount owed was valid. Thus, the sole issue for decision was whether
32 Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 264 (1980), afd in part and rev'd in part, 659
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
33 See id.; Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 400 (1979); Greenberg's Express, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324, 327 (1974).
34 See, e.g., Greenberg's Express, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324, 329 (1974) (discrim-
inatory audit procedures would not invalidate assessment); Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.
792, 813 (1972) (no rule requiring Tax Court to ascertain whether IRS relied on improper
evidence). See generally 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 22, § 50.59 (general rule because de novo
trial) & § 50.61 (determination need not be based on admissible evidence).
The rationale that a de novo trial makes it unnecessary to determine if the notice is
arbitrary is inadequate because the presumption of correctness afforded the deficiency notice
plays such a key role in that trial.
35 Under certain circumstances, the Tax Court will also "look behind" the deficiency
notice when the taxpayer's constitutional rights are violated. Guzzetta v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 173, 180-84 (1982). In Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 (1972), the Tax Court
developed a broad exception for constitutional violations which was limited in Guzzetta as a
result of the interveningJanir decision. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
36 Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 264 (1980), aJ'd in part and rev'd in part, 649
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 198 1); Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 410 (1979); see9J. MERTENS,
supra note 22, § 50.61.
37 293 U.S. 507 (1935).
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the taxpayer had the burden of establishing the correct amount of tax
owed after a finding that the assessed deficiency was arbitrary.
38
The Court held that the taxpayer did not have to establish the
amount owed: "We find nothing. . . that gives any support to the idea
that the commissioner's determination, shown to be without rational
foundation and excessive, will be enforced unless the taxpayer proves he
owes nothing or. . . shows the correct amount. '39 The Taylor opinion
did not, however, address any substantive aspects of defining arbitrari-
ness nor any procedural aspects of alleging or showing arbitrariness. As
a result, the Court's statement that "[u]nquestionably the burden of
proof is on the taxpayer to show that the commissioner's determination
is invalid," 4° must be considered dicta.
The Supreme Court first discussed the substance of arbitrariness in
the context of tax assessment in United States v. Jani.4t Janis was ar-
rested for bookmaking activity, and subsequently the IRS assessed wa-
gering taxes against him. The IRS reached its assessment by
extrapolating from betting records seized in a police raid. When the
search warrant relied on in the raid was later quashed, Janis sought to
suppress the IRS's use of the illegally seized evidence in the tax assess-
ment proceedings.4 2 The Court noted that, because Janis submitted no
evidence, under the normal presumption he could not prevail. "But "the
present case may well not be the usual situation. What we have is a
'naked' assessment without any foundation" if the illegal evidence is not
admitted.43 The Court concluded that if the district court had correctly
excluded the evidence, it was correct in ruling for Janis: "[P]roof that
an assessment is utterly without foundation is proof that it is arbitrary
and erroneous."44 The Janis Court, however, admitted the evidence,
and so the references to arbitrary assessment are dicta.
Judicial opinions differ on the procedural aspects of alleging arbi-
trariness-whether the taxpayer must show that the IRS determination
38 Id. at 511-12.
39 d. at 514.
40 Id. at 515. Judge Fay characterized the Taylor holding as follows: "I/f the taxpayer
has shown the notice of deficiency to be arbitrary and excessive, then the respondent must
show the correct amount. . . ." Llorente v. Commmissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 271 (1980) (Fay,
J., concurring) (emphasis in original), afdin part andrev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
Accord Piper & Jerge, supra note 9, at 318; Sampanis, A View of the Evidentiag, Prerequisites for the
Presumption of Correctness in Tax Defiiency Cases, 8 REv. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 49, 53 (1984);
Note, supra note 22, at 648.
A more narrow reading of the Taylor holding, however, is that, assuming a deficiency
notice is arbitrary and excessive, the taxpayer does not have to prove the correct amount
owed. The Court's statement that the burden of persuasion is on the taxpayer to prove the
determination invalid is dictum.
41 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
42 Id. at 436-38.
43 Id. at 441 (emphasis in original).
44 Id. at 442.
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is arbitrary or whether the burden is on the Commissioner to show that
it is not.45 The Taylor dicta places the burden on the taxpayer to show
that the deficiency determination is invalid;46 the Janis dicta indicates
that a tax assessment may be found arbitrary without the taxpayer sub-
mitting any evidence.47 This apparent discrepancy is attributable to the
different factual circumstances of Taylor and JaMs.
In Taylor the taxpayer was not denying receipt of funds, but was
disputing the amount realized as income on the sale of stock; the issue
was the apportionment of a purchase price between preferred and com-
mon stock.48 The critical evidence stemmed from the taxpayer's ac-
knowledged transactions. No policy reason exists in such cases to refrain
from placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer "to show that the
commissioner's determination is invalid.
'49
In contrast, the issue in Janis was proof of receipt. The IRS based
its deficiency notice on alleged wagering; the critical evidence was the
illegally seized records. 50 This fundamental difference in factual context
justifies the different procedural approaches propounded in the two
cases.
IV
ARBITRARINESS WHEN THE TAXPAYER DENIES RECEIPT
Recognizing the inequity of requiring the taxpayer to prove a nega-
tive, courts have struggled to define a precise standard for assessing an
allegation of IRS arbitrariness in denial of receipt cases. Because these
cases often involve alleged illegal activity by the taxpayer, the standard
for admissibility of evidence that the IRS can use to show that a defi-
ciency notice is not arbitrary may be as significant as the standard used
to define arbitrariness. 51
Weimerskirch v. Commissioner-2 involved a contested deficiency as-
sessed on alleged undeclared income from illegal heroin sales. At the
45 Compare United Aniline Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701, 704 (lst Cir. 1963) (tax-
payer never loses burden of proving Commissioner's determination erroneous) andLlorente v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 271 (1980) (Fay, J., concurring) (Taylor holding requires taxpayer
to show notice is arbitrary), afd in part and rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981) with
Gerardo v. Commissioner, 552 F.2d 549, 554 (3d Cir. 1977) (Commissioner must provide
"some predicate evidence" connecting taxpayer with money-making activity in order to sup-
port presumption of correctness) and Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 698 (5th Cir.
1977) (some evidence that taxpayer was engaged in money-making activity is necessary predi-
cate for presumption of correctness).
46 See supra text accompanying note 40.
47 See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
48 Tay/or, 293 U.S. at 511.
49 Id. at 515.
50 Janif, 428 U.S. at 436-37.
51 See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
52 596 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979).
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trial below, Weimerskirch presented four witnesses and his tax return;
the IRS produced no evidence. After in camera inspection of IRS files
and informers' reports, to which Weimerskirch was denied access, the
Tax Court determined that the IRS was not arbitrary and held that
Weimerskirch failed to overcome the presumption of correctness.53
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "[a] deficiency determina-
tion which is not supported by the proper foundation of substantive evi-
dence is clearly arbitrary and erroneous. '54 The court stated in dicta
that the Commissioner "cannot rely on the presumption in the absence
of a minimal evidentiary foundation" even when the taxpayer is silent
and offers no evidence.
55
In Gerardo v. Commissioner,5 6 the Third Circuit required that, "in or-
der to give effect to the presumption [of correctness] . . . , some evidence
must appear which would support an inference of the taxpayer's in-
volvement in gambling activity during the period covered by the assess-
ment. '57 Gerardo had been convicted of conspiracy to operate a lottery
for the period August 1966 to February 1967; the IRS subsequently esti-
mated gambling income from April 1966 through February 1967 and
assessed a deficiency.58 Although the Tax Court, relying on the pre-
sumption of correctness, upheld the entire assessment, the Third Circuit
reversed in part and eliminated the receipts attributed to April through
August 1966, for which there was no evidence.5
9
In Llorente v. Commissioner,6° the Second Circuit applied a standard
similar to that adopted by the Ninth Circuit. 61 The Llorente court held
that proof of involvement with an activity is insufficient to show that the
IRS was not arbitrary; "the evidence of record must at least link the
taxpayer with some tax-generating acts .... -62 The Second Circuit
rejected the Tax Court's application of a standard similar to the Third
53 67 T.C. 672, 678 (1977), rev'd, 596 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979).
54 596 F.2d at 362 (footnote omitted).
55 Id. at 361 (dicta). The Tax Court has criticized this approach, "find[ing] practical
difficulty in applying such a broadly stated rule." Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 404
(1979).
The Ninth Circuit has recently restated its Weirerskirch rule as follows: "[N]o presump-
tion of correctness attaches to deficiency determinations in which the IRS charges a taxpayer
with additional income but provides no factual showing that the taxpayer actually received
the income in question." United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1984) (dicta).
56 552 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1977).
57 Id. at 554. This Third Circuit standard, requiring "some evidence. . which would
support an inference of the taxpayer's involvement," is weaker than the Ninth Circuit stan-
dard, requiring a factual showing of actual receipt. See supra note 55.
58 552 F.2d at 551-52.
59 I. at 554.
60 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
61 See supra note 55.
62 649 F.2d at 156. But cf. Sampanis, supra note 40, at 67 (criticizing the Second Circuit
for not taking the opportunity presented in Llornie to formulate clearer guidelines).
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Circuit's formulation in Gerardo.63 The Tax Court had held in Llorente
that the deficiency notice was not arbitrary because there were sufficient
facts showing that the taxpayer had engaged in the activity.64 Hearsay
evidence based on information from an informant linked Llorente to a
cocaine purchase,65 and an undercover agent testified to hearing
Llorente refer to a drug shipment. In addition, Llorente had been in-
dicted and subsequently pled guilty to charges of conspiring to possess
and sell a controlled substance. Although this evidence established "pe-
ripheral contact with illegal conduct," the Second Circuit nevertheless
held that it was insufficient to link the taxpayer to tax-generating acts.66
The Tax Court itself refused to uphold the presumption of correct-
ness in Jackson v. Commissioner.67 In denying the receipt of money from
drug sales, Jackson offered only his own "self-serving denials" in evi-
dence.6a Although such denials are ordinarily insufficient to overcome
the presumption, the Tax Court, deeming this to be one of the "rare
occasions" requiring an exception, 69 found the determination to be arbi-
trary and excessive on the basis of the highly suspect information sub-
mitted by the IRS: the agent who prepared the deficiency notice
against Jackson had relied on information from an informant who had
been arrested and was cooperating to get a lighter sentence. The in-
formant later fled; after rearrest, he refused to cooperate and was
convicted.70
The preceding examples demonstrate that the different standards
for determining arbitrariness reflect judicial disagreement regarding the
type of evidence which may be used to meet that standard.71 The Tax
63 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
64 Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 266 (1980), afd in part and re 'd in part, 649
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981). A dissenting opinion argued that the majority missed the point, that
"the primary question to be answered is not whether petitioner was associated with the drug
business but whether respondent was reasonable in his assertion that petitioner had $54,000
of unreported income from that source." 74 T.C. at 281 (Drennen, J., dissenting).
65 The IRS reconstructed Llorente's income by the expenditure method. See infra note
89. The IRS documented living costs and the purchase of a tavern and asserted a sizeable
expenditure for cocaine. The Second Circuit held that the IRS failed to establish that
Llorente had purchased the drugs.
66 Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d at 156-57.
67 73 T.C. 394, 401-03 (1979).
68 Id. at 399.
69 Id at 401.
70 The agent believed the information against Jackson was credible. The Tax Court
disagreed, finding that "the elaborate construct set out in the deficiency notice, based solely as
it was on a secondhand report of peripheral statements made by an unreliable informant,
turns out to be sheer gossamer." Id at 403.
In Jackson, the Tax Court did not decide what would have happened if the IRS had
submitted no evidence. This question was addressed in Llorente dicta in which the court indi-
cated that the Commissioner cannot rely solely on the presumption of correctness. See supra
text accompanying notes 31 & 35-36.
71 See, e.g., Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 266 n.4 (1980), afd in part and rev'd in
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Court permits the IRS to submit inadmissible evidence for the limited
purpose of showing that a deficiency notice is not arbitrary.72 One judge
has criticized this practice because it allows the court to "[bootstrap] the
evidence which it claims is admissible to show that the notice of defi-
ciency was not arbitrary in order to establish a presumption based on
evidence which would not be admissible to prove the deficiency.173 The
Ninth Circuit requires a foundation of "substantive evidence" 74 to sup-
port a deficiency determination, while in Llorente the Second Circuit re-
jected the use of hearsay to support the rational basis of a deficiency
notice because such evidence was inadmissible to establish the truth of
the facts asserted. 75 When courts do rely on hearsay evidence of receipt
to determine whether an allegation is arbitrary, it is difficult and often
impossible for the taxpayer to overcome the presumed correctness of the
IRS deficiency assessment. 76
V
EFFECT OF SHOWING ARBITRARINESS ON BURDENS OF
PROOF AND PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS
The Supreme Court, in Taylor, held that an arbitrary deficiency
determination is unenforceable and the taxpayer has no burden to prove
the correct amount.7 7 The Court, in dicta, said, "The fact that the com-
missioner's determination of a deficiency was arbitrarily made may rea-
sonably be deemed sufficient to require the board [of tax appeals] to set
it aside." s78 The Tax Court, instead of regarding an arbitrary determi-
nation as invalid, simply shifts the production burden to the Commis-
sioner; a showing of arbitrariness does not render the IRS deficiency
part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981). Indeed, there is some intra-Circuit disagreement as well.
See infra note 74.
72 Eg., Llorente, 74 T.C. at 265 & n.3; Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 400 (1979).
The Tax Court rules provide that trials "be conducted in accordance with the rules of evi-
dence applicable in trials without a jury in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia." TAX CT. R. 143(a).
73 Llorente, 74 T.C. at 282 (Drennen, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 22, at 655-
56 (arguing that Tax Court's approach of requiring evidence linking taxpayer to activity
provides loophole for devious taxpayer, while affording little protection to innocent taxpayer
because standard applied is so lax).
74 Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Avery v.
Commissioner, 574 F.2d 467, 468 (9th Cir. 1978) (hearsay evidence admissible for limited
purpose of showing IRS did not act arbitrarily in assessing deficiency). The Weimerskirch
court attempts to distinguish Avery, but skirts the issue as to the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence. Weimerskirch, 596 F.2d at 362 n.7.
75 Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1981).
76 Note, supra note 22, at 656-57 (court implicitly decides hearsay testimony is trustwor-
thy when it bases its decision that a determination is not arbitrary on such evidence); see supra
text accompanying note 73.
77 Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514 (1935).
78 Id. (dicta) (citations omitted).
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notice null and void.79 This result is the same as when the taxpayer
shows that the determination is erroneous: the presumption of correct-
ness vanishes, shifting the burden of production to the Commissioner,
but leaving the burden of persuasion on the taxpayer.80
VI
PROPOSAL
When the IRS assesses a deficiency item based on undeclared in-
come, the contesting taxpayer has three options-deny receipt, deny
that the benefits received are includible in income, or dispute the
amount of income. This Note proposes a procedure for altering the nor-
mal burdens of proof when the taxpayer denies receipt.81
The rationale for placing the burden of persuasion on the taxpayer
in Tax Court proceedings is the assumption that the taxpayer has the
best knowledge of, or best access to, evidence of the underlying transac-
tions. This burden is reasonable when the taxpayer is called on to prove
an affirmative, such as sustaining a deduction or showing the character
or amount of income. Different policy questions arise when the tax-
payer must prove a negative-nonreceipt. This proposal is intended to
assure that the IRS develops and presents a prima facie case before the
taxpayer needs to assume the difficult task of substantiating
79 E.g., Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 814 (1972); see also, e.g., Llorente v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 260, 264 (1980) ("a showing. . . that the statutory notice is arbitrarily
excessive . ..has the effect of shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence")
(dicta), affd in part and rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981). But cf. Llorente v. Commis-
sioner, 649 F.2d 152, 155 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that six judges of Tax Court majority
disagreed on effect a finding of arbitrariness would have on burdens of persuasion and pro-
duction); see also Scar v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 855, 862 (1983) (dicta) ("the burden of going
forward or the burden of proof is shifted"). The examples indicate that the question of what
burdens shift remains unsettled. See generally Piper & Jerge, supra note 9, at 313 (noting that
Taylor did not make clear what burden shifts; inference from subsequent cases is that only
burden of production shifts). As observed supra note 29, the First Circuit argues that neither
burden ever shifts to the Commissioner.
Judge Tannenwald argues that a showing of arbitrariness shifts the burden of proof to
the Commissioner. Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 278-79 (1980) (Tannenwald, J.,
concurring), afd in part and rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981). Because Judge Tannen-
wald speaks of two burdens, the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the
evidence, id at 276-77, his use of the phrase "burden of proof" is assumed to refer to the
burden of persuasion as used in this Note.
The Second Circuit has followed the Taylor lead by ordering that an item in the Commis-
sioner's assessment without evidentiary support, and therefore arbitrary, "must be eliminated
from the Notice of Deficiency." Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1981).
Overcoming the presumption for one item or showing one item to be arbitrary will not
affect the presumption in favor of other items in the notice. E.g., Clark v. Commissioner, 266
F.2d 698, 707 (9th Cir. 1959); see also 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 22, § 50.61.
80 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
81 This proposal does not affect the current approach to dealing with other cases of
undeclared income. A strong argument could be made for separating issues of receipt, then
treating the remaining cases the same as deductions, i.e., requiring the taxpayer to show cor-
rect amount. See Rice, supra note 19, at 65-68.
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nonreceipt.8 2
Under the present system, a taxpayer denying receipt must over-
come the presumption of correctness by presenting sufficient evidence
that the deficiency determination could be erroneous. 83 The presump-
tion of correctness establishes the threshold level of evidence the tax-
payer must produce. Some courts have responded to the inherent
difficulties of proving a negative by refusing to allow the IRS to rely on
the presumption without showing that the deficiency determination is
not arbitrary.84 Hearsay and other inadmissible evidence is often ad-
missible to show the absence of arbitrariness and to support the pre-
sumption of correctness,85 thereby reinstating the taxpayer's evidentiary
threshold without providing a real indication of the substantive quality
of the IRS case. This procedure often artificially and unfairly increases
the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the taxpayer's initial pro-
duction burden because the court does not weigh the taxpayer's evi-
dence against the actual strength of the IRS evidence until the taxpayer
overcomes the presumption of correctness.8 6 Thus, the taxpayer may
fail to overcome a presumption of correctness which attaches by the lim-
ited use of hearsay or other inadmissible evidence when, in fact, there is
scant substantive evidence supporting the IRS deficiency notice.
This Note proposes that the Tax Court develop a procedure
whereby a taxpayer denying receipt of money or benefits may submit to
the Tax Court a sworn statement of denial, together with a statement of
supporting facts, and thereby shift the burden of proof to the Commis-
sioner. The statement would have to contain affirmative representations
of the taxpayer's position, not mere denials of the deficiency assess-
ment.87 To prevent a taxpayer from using discovery to determine how
much the IRS can prove before deciding how much to deny, the proce-
dure would require submission of the denial statement and supporting
facts prior to any requests for discovery under the Tax Court rules. Fur-
thermore, to discourage taxpayers from denying receipt simply to shift
the burden of proof to the Commissioner, the procedure would subject
any person making willful misrepresentations to penalties for fraudulent
82 Under the present system the IRS may be called upon to establish the correct amount
when the taxpayer has shown the deficiency determination to be erroneous. See supra notes 8-
9 and accompanying text. Under this proposal, the IRS may not have to establish the correct
amount as frequently because the presumption of correctness will attach to the amount after
proof of receipt.
83 See supra text accompanying note 24.
84 See supra notes 31 & 35-36 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
87 See United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing "excul-
patory no" doctrine limiting liability for fraud and willful misrepresentation when defendant
or suspect, in interview he did not initiate, replies to questions only in negative).
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statements or perjury.8 8
Under the proposed procedure, the Commissioner would bear the
burden of persuading the court by a preponderance of the evidence that
the taxpayer received money or benefits in excess of the gross income
declared or receipts acknowledged in the statement of denial. Once the
Commissioner produces evidence of receipt or establishes income
through a reconstruction method,8 9 the presumption of correctness
should attach to the amount of the deficiency assessed on that income.
Although the IRS would retain the burden of persuasion to prove re-
ceipt, the taxpayer would have the burden of persuasion to establish an
amount lower than that alleged by the IRS. The taxpayer could submit
evidence regarding the reasonableness of the amount asserted but evi-
dence from the actual transaction showing a lower amount would also
tend to show the taxpayer's knowledge of that amount. In most cases,
therefore, a taxpayer submitting evidence from the actual transaction
after having sworn denial of receipt would risk liability for perjury or
fraudulent statement.
Under this proposal, a taxpayer who denies receipt of money or
benefits could opt to proceed under the current burdens and presump-
tion. The taxpayer should not be allowed to place an initial burden of
substantiation on the IRS, however, by alleging that the deficiency no-
tice imputing receipt is arbitrary. If the taxpayer opts for the current
system and denies receipt, the IRS would be entitled to rely on the pre-
sumption of correctness without producing direct evidence. One advan-
tage the taxpayer may see in the current system is the opportunity this
system affords him to allege inconsistent theories in the pleadings. 90 The
taxpayer can alternatively deny receipt and allege that, if received, the
money is not includible in income. In selecting this strategy, the tax-
payer would have to weigh such advantages against the risk of failing to
overcome the presumption of correctness and failing to sustain the bur-
den of persuasion.
A taxpayer opting to shift the burden as proposed in this Note
would have to submit a sufficient, sworn statement of denial and sup-
porting facts. The taxpayer could admit part of the deficiency and sub-
mit the statement to shift the burden of persuasion for the remainder.
88 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (false statements to government agencies); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621 (1982) (perjury); 26 U.S.C. § 7207 (1982) (fraudulent statements to IRS).
89 Income can be reconstructed, for example, through the "net worth" method by estab-
lishing a baseline net worth at a particular time, then demonstrating the increase in net worth
plus nondeductible expenditures. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 125 (1954)
(criminal prosecution). The "cash expenditures" method, not generally considered accurate,
reconstructs income by subtracting ascertainable cash receipts from ascertainable cash ex-
penditures. Any unexplained excess represents unreported income. See, e.g., Goldberg v.
Commissioner, 239 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1956). See generally 2 J. MERTENS, supra note 22,
§ 12.12 (discussing income reconstruction methods and their application).
90 2 L. CASEY, supra note 25, § 7.2.
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For example, if the IRS asserts undeclared income of $50,000 from a
particular source, the taxpayer could admit receipt of $20,000 and deny
the remaining $30,000. Although admitting receipt of the $20,000, the
taxpayer could still contest its inclusion in income but would have the
burdens of persuasion and production (against the presumption of cor-
rectness) on that issue. The presumption of correctness would attach to
the entire $50,000 when the IRS produced evidence that the taxpayer
received in excess of the $20,000 admitted. The taxpayer would then
have to submit proof of the lower amount. This production burden
could shift throughout the trial, but ultimately, if the Commissioner
persuades the court that the taxpayer received more than the admitted
$20,000, the taxpayer must prove any lesser amount to avoid a defi-
ciency based on the full $50,000.
If the taxpayer chose to deny the whole amount, the presumption
would attach when the IRS proved receipt of any significant amount,
e.g., $5,000.91 The taxpayer could still contest the amount on the
grounds of reasonableness and other evidence, depending on the nature
of the asserted transaction.
Under this proposal, a taxpayer denying receipt of money or bene-
fits attributed to him or her in an IRS deficiency notice could place the
burden of persuasion on the Commissioner by submitting a statement of
denial and supporting facts rather than alleging arbitrariness in the IRS
deficiency notice. This tactic would reduce the evidentiary issues that
have arisen over the use of inadmissible evidence to determine that a
deficiency notice was not arbitrary.92 The Commissioner would not be
required to show the determination is nonarbitrary, and therefore would
not need to submit hearsay and other normally inadmissible evidence
for that limited purpose. Rather, the Commissioner would submit evi-
dence for the truth of the underlying facts: such evidence would be sub-
ject to the normal rules of evidence for admissibility. 93 Under this
proposal, the quantum of the burden on the taxpayer to substantiate
nonreceipt would be directly related to the strength of the evidence put
forward by the IRS. 94 The taxpayer denying receipt would no longer
risk failing to overcome the artificially erected presumption of correct-
ness in what may be a weak IRS case, simply because he or she could
not produce sufficient evidence of nonreceipt.
91 The amount necessary to trigger the presumption would be discretionary with the
Tax Court. The amount proven at this stage must be sufficiently substantial for it to be
reasonable to attach the presumption of correctness to the whole amount.
92 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 72. The proposal in this Note would not preclude the use of inadmissi-
ble evidence in preparing a deficiency notice. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
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Other exceptions exist, in both the Tax Court rules95 and the stat-
utes,9 6 which place the burden of persuasion on the Commissioner for
certain issues. The proposal offered in this Note is based on the statu-
tory scheme for the accumulated earnings tax.97 That tax imposes a
penalty on certain accumulated corporate earnings. The Code
presumes that a corporation accumulates earnings beyond its reasonable
business needs only for the purpose of avoiding tax on its shareholders.
The burden of proving otherwise falls on the corporation, but the corpo-
ration can shift the burden to the IRS by submitting a sufficient state-
ment of the business purposes and supporting facts for the
accumulation. 98 The accumulated earnings tax was developed, in part,
in response to taxpayers who incurred substantial expense and effort to
litigate deficiencies which the IRS had not adequately screened or
analyzed.99
The policy argument for placing the burden of persuasion on the
Commissioner is even stronger in the case of a taxpayer denying receipt
than in the accumulated earnings tax situation. A taxpayer in a nonre-
ceipt case does not necessarily have a transaction or records from which
to build a case. On the other hand, the corporation contesting the accu-
mulated earnings tax has best access to all the financial and program-
matic plans and projections used in deciding whether to accumulate
earnings or to declare a dividend.
CONCLUSION
The burden of persuasion falls on the taxpayer in most tax proceed-
ings because no one has better knowledge of receipts or better access to
evidence of transactions. In proving nonreceipt of extra money, how-
ever, the taxpayer faces almost insurmountable difficulties. Absent wit-
nesses or records of nonreceipt, the taxpayer must often rely on his or
her credibility as a witness, and the Tax Court gives little weight to self-
serving denials. In addition, many of the cases of contested receipt are
brought by taxpayers allegedly involved in illegal activities. Evidence of
these activities, introduced to sustain the presumption of correctness,
95 The Commissioner has the burden of proving any new matter, increases in deficiency,
or affirmative defense pleaded in his answer. TAX CT. R. 142(a).
96 E.g., I.R.C. § 83(d) (1982) (burden of proving formula price in nonlapse restriction is
not fair market value); I.R.C. § 162(c) (1982) (burden of proving illegality of bribes and kick-
backs); I.R.C. § 6902(a) (1982) (burden of proving transferee liability).
97 I.R.C. §§ 533-34 (1982).
98 The corporation "is required in the statement only to present facts sufficient to show
the basis of the grounds it relies upon, not to establish its case." If the statement is sufficient
"to shift the burden of proof.. . the Government must assume the burden of persuasion that
the accumulation was unreasonable. The party having the burden of proof does not merely
have the burden of coming forward with evidence; it has the burden of persuasion and once
fixed that burden does not shift." 2 L. CASEY, supra note 25, § 7.3a, at n.4 (citations omitted).
99 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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further undermines the taxpayer's credibility, even though the evidence
may not show that the taxpayer received money.
The courts have used the indefinable catch-all concept of arbitrari-
ness to deal with the inequity of requiring the taxpayer to prove a nega-
tive. The various standards and procedural questions described in this
Note are indicative of the difficult balancing which comes into play
when a taxpayer denies receipt of money or benefits attributed to him or
her in an IRS deficiency notice.
This Note recommends removing disputes over denial from the ru-
bric of arbitrariness. The Note proposes instituting a procedure analo-
gous to that available in contesting an accumulated earnings tax, by
which the taxpayer, with a sworn statement of denial and sufficient sup-
porting facts, can place the burden of persuasion on the IRS.
Christina Potter Moraski
